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Commentary
illiam English provides an overview of the recent 
Group of Ten (G-10) “Report on Consolidation in the 
Financial Sector” (better known as the Ferguson report1), with 
a special focus on the effects of financial consolidation on U.S. 
monetary policy. On the one hand, because the G-10 report 
was published a few months ago, discussing his paper should be 
a simple task, considering how I was spared the stress afflicting 
some discussants when they receive a paper they might be 
unfamiliar with, typically a few hours before a conference. On 
the other hand, commenting on this paper is far from easy. The 
G-10 report was the result of a long process of preparation 
involving central banks and treasury officials from many 
countries. English’s paper faithfully conveys the thrust of the 
report. As such, its content was carefully “filtered” by 
discussion among many parties and reflects a consensus view. 
This tends to leave little room for disagreement.
The English paper, in line with the report, distinguishes 
three possible effects of banking and financial consolidation: 
those on the implementation of monetary policy (that is, on the 
operations through which central banks affect money market 
conditions and the supply of central bank money), those on the 
transmission of policy, and those on the environment in which 
monetary policy operates. As English explains, the 
implementation of policy may be affected if bank consolidation 
significantly reduces the number of players in the money 
market. This could diminish the degree of competitiveness of 
this market and of the process through which central bank 
money is allocated. The transmission of monetary policy may 
be affected through changes in the mechanism of the pass-
through of policy rates, through changes in the speed and 
extent of the pass-through of policy rates, and through changes 
in the relative importance of different channels, such as the 
lending channel or the interest rate channel. Furthermore, the 
monetary policy environment may change, for example, if 
cross-market or cross-country financial linkages are 
strengthened as a result of consolidation (such as 
concentration that increases herd behaviour in the financial 
market) or if the significance of certain monetary policy 
indicators, such as monetary aggregates, is reduced.
The general conclusion of the paper is that there is no 
evidence that the trend toward bank and financial 
consolidation observed in recent years in most industrial 
economies has significantly affected monetary policy. This 
conclusion is based on both an examination of the empirical 
evidence and surveys conducted among the participating 
central banks. First, although bank consolidation has indeed 
tended in many countries to reduce the number of active 
players in money markets and the number of counterparts of 
central bank operations, this does not appear to have affected 
money market competition in a significant way. Also, no 
distortions or inefficiencies in the allocation of central bank 
money have become apparent. Similarly, no significant effects 
on the functioning of securities markets and, hence, on changes 
in the impact of policy changes on the yield curve, have been 
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detected. As to the effects on bank rates or the supply of credit, 
the paper correctly argues that the relevance of such effects for 
the transmission mechanism hinges, directly or indirectly, on 
the existence of a significant “lending channel” or “balance-
sheet channel” of monetary transmission. As is well-known, 
the empirical evidence on such effects is quite ambiguous. 
Finally, no convincing evidence is found to indicate that the 
monetary policy environment has been affected by bank 
consolidation.
Once again, I find little to disagree with the general message 
of the paper. The evidence is indeed ambiguous. Although one 
could make several theoretical cases for consolidation to 
impact monetary policy in a variety of ways, no conclusion can 
be drawn from the presently available empirical evidence. At 
the same time, one can argue, as English does, that since 
consolidation is a recent and ongoing phenomenon in many 
countries, monetary policy could eventually be affected in ways 
that are still difficult to discern. This could be true particularly 
in the Euro area, where important changes in the structure of 
the banking system have been triggered by the introduction of 
the single currency and are now actively under way. I will 
devote the remainder of my comments to the Euro area, 
presenting data that allow us to compare the cross-country 
patterns of bank concentration with the evidence available on 
the strength and timing of monetary policy transmission.
The table summarises these data. Specifically, the first two 
columns show, for selected countries, a measure of bank 
concentration—namely, the Herfindahl index calculated from 
the market shares in the deposit market and the growth rate of 
the Herfindahl index over the 1995-99 period.2 The data 
indicate that bank concentration differs substantially across 
Euro area countries. It ranges from very high levels in the 
smaller countries (Belgium, the Netherlands), where a limited 
number of banks exist, to intermediate levels in the larger 
countries (France, Spain, Italy), to very low levels in Germany, 
where the banking system is notoriously fragmented.3 These 
data can be somewhat misleading in that they assume that the 
country’s economy represents the relevant market for the 
national banking system; however, available empirical evidence 
suggests that in the Euro area this may still be the appropriate 
working assumption.4 Furthermore, the table shows that there 
are also substantial differences in the speed of consolidation 
across countries. The data for the Euro area as a whole and for 
the United States tend to indicate that the banking sector in the 
Euro area is less concentrated, although not by very much.
The data on bank concentration can be compared with 
some summary statistics on the strength and timing of 
monetary transmission. The table also includes summary 
measures obtained from published sources, whenever 
comparable estimates exist. Columns 3 and 4 examine the pass-
through of changes in money market rates to bank deposit and 
lending rates, respectively, measured by the effect of a 100-
basis-point change in the money market rates to the relevant 
bank rate, also measured in basis points.5 It is worth noting that 
although significant cross-country differentiation exists in 
these measures, it is very hard to identify patterns that can be 
related to the measures of bank concentration in any insightful 
way. The lowest intensity of pass-through for both bank rates 
appears to characterise Spain, a country that is close to the 
median in terms of bank concentration. However, Germany, 
which stands at the lower extreme of bank concentration, is 
close to the median in terms of bank rate pass-through. 




















Belgium 130 84 0.61 0.55 4 1.1
France 75 35 NA 0.42 2 0.4
Germany 11 60 0.43 0.54 8 0.6
Italy 37 -10 0.43 0.58 4 0.2
Netherlands 248 -7 0.32 0.86 4 0.6
Spain 48 51 0.11 0.22 4 0.2
Euro area 6 15 0.35 0.53 5 0.4
United States 12 23 NA 0.74 7 0.7
Sources: Corvoisier and Gropp (2001a); Bankscope; Mojon (2000); Mojon and Peersman (2001); Borio and Fritz (1995); Christiano et al. (1999).FRBNY Economic Policy Review / Forthcoming 3
Percentage of pass-through after three months
Bank Concentration and Four Measures
of Monetary Transmission
Concentration and Interest Rate Pass-Through, Credit

























Concentration and Interest Rate Pass-Through, Deposits






























aEffect of a 100-basis-point shock to monetary policy.
Concentration and
Maximum-Output Effecta
Focusing on the aggregate numbers for the Euro area and for 
the United States, one notes that the pass-through on lending 
rates in the United States6 seems to be stronger than that for the 
Euro area average (data for deposits are not available on a 
comparable basis). This seems consistent with the idea that a 
higher bank concentration leads to stronger or faster pass-
through, although it would clearly be hazardous to draw any 
conclusions from such limited evidence.
The last two columns of the table focus on the effect of 
monetary policy changes on real GDP. To this end, summary 
measures are reported for both the speed and the intensity of 
the effect of policy.7 Speed is measured by the number of 
quarters it takes for the policy change to attain its peak effect on 
output. Intensity is measured by the size of the peak effect. 
Again, it is very hard to discern any consistent pattern in these 
data. For example, a slow and moderate effect of policy on 
output seems to characterise France, a country that is not far 
from the median value in terms of concentration.
The chart presents scatter plots of the Herfindhal index, as 
defined above, for the four measures of monetary transmission 
in the table. The panels illustrate the lack of an apparent cross-
country correlation pattern between the measure of 
concentration and the transmission of monetary policy.
Needless to say, this evidence is very crude and, even if taken 
at face value, could admit other interpretations. For instance, 
the lack of bilateral correlation in the panels could well be 
consistent with the existence of a consolidation effect on 
monetary transmission, if third factors were at play. As an 
example, there is some recent evidence that in the Euro area the 
contestability of banking markets may have increased with the 
advent of Internet banking.8 If this were the case, the 
concentration measures used in the G-10 report would no 
longer be an adequate indicator of bank structures. Although 
no strong conclusion can be drawn, these measures are 
suggestive, as they confirm the conclusion by English (and by 
the G-10 report) that bank, or financial, consolidation does not 
seem to affect the transmission of monetary policy in a 
systematic way.Endnotes
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1. The report, published in January 2001, was prepared by a task force 
chaired by Roger W. Ferguson, Vice Chairman of the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
2. These data are drawn from Corvoisier and Gropp (2001a). Figures 
for the Herfindahl index are presented instead of market shares of the 
largest banks, as Herfindahl indexes will also reflect the ongoing 
consolidation among smaller banks, which may be particularly 
important in the larger Euro area countries. 
3. It is useful to emphasise that the degree of competition and the 
degree of concentration in a market are only loosely related for any 
number of reasons. For example, although Germany appears 
fragmented at first sight, the country may in fact be much less 
competitive than these figures suggest. This is because virtually all of 
the very small banks in Germany are part of larger networks, within 
which markets are often divided regionally (see, for example, 
Ehrmann and Worms [2001]). This suggests that the many small 
banks may in fact not be competing fully with each other.
4. Corvoisier and Gropp (2001a). The reason for this ongoing 
fragmentation across Euro area countries largely seems to be 
differences in regulation.
5. For details on the estimation, see Mojon (2000).
6. Data are from Borio and Fritz (1995).
7. See Mojon and Peersman (2001) and Christiano et al. (1999). 
8. Corvoisier and Gropp (2001b).References
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